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Chapter 7

Nature, Nurture and Nietzsche's Faith in
Life
Nalin Ranasinghe

Nietzsche's earliest published works are also his clearest. They reveal an intense
struggle between pessimistic presuppositions and life-affirming aspirations.
Since this paradoxical opposition extends throughout Nietzsche's philosophical
career, thoughtful consideration of its origin may shed light on some of his bewildering later writings. Using close readings of The Birth of Tragedy (BT) and
the second Untimely Meditation: On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life (UM2) I will show how and why Nietzsche goes back to Classical
Greece seeking a pessimism of strength adequate to the dire threat posed by the
Death of God. 1 This event, famously proclaimed by Nietzsche, 2 came about
through the triumphs of science and democracy. Yet the herald of these lusty
tidings was himself deeply troubled by the cultural and moral chaos that he saw
following the consequent unopposed rise of egalitarianism and collapse of hierarchy; he tried hard to combat and forestall nihilistic developments that would
lead to the Death of Man.
Nietzsche was convinced that without religious or aristocratic power to curb
them, the hubris of vulgar democratizing forces would bring about the suicide of
humanity itself. Although recent events may well have justified these fears, his
deeply misanthropic assumptions poisoned his own noble attempts to rescue
high culture from vulgar demotic civilization. These views also led him to develop a philosophy of history that legitimized untruth, prejudice and violence.
At the level of practice, his underlying pessimism caused Nietzsche to endorse a
political regime that uncannily reproduced the tripartite structure, noble lies and
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cynical psychology of Plato's draconian Republic. Sadly, this fusion of radically
Modem means-symptomatic of the very decadence Nietzsche sought to forestall-and lofty Classical ends helped set in motion a cult of power that first
caused two World Wars and then, over-reacting to itself, engendered a virulently
resentful anti-humanism that has mortally wounded both the nation state and the
academy-spawning an incontinent generation of de-politicized consumers who
live as post-natural slaves.
The first two parts of this chapter will study Nietzsche's earliest writings.
Here he is most confident about his project and accordingly, quite explicit about
its bleak ontological assumptions. In his later most famous writings, Nietzsche
chooses to be poetic rather than philosophical; he nevertheless signals fairly
clearly that this change in idiom has to do with his loss of faith in the capacity of
his own generation to bear the great spiritual burdens demanded by the Death of
God. Accordingly, as the gap between the spiritual haves and have-nots of the
world widened dramatically, he came to believe that his generation's moral decadence had to be accelerated. Thus, the few who still knew the meaning of nobility would see the need to direct humanity towards an elitist culture of lifeaffirmation and away from the ruins of post-Christian egalitarianism. He feared
that since his own age was already poorly prepared for the brutal demands made
by life, the future could leave the human spirit permanently impotent. Even
though he did not really believe with his sometime disciple Heidegger that anything truly noble would survive the storm of nihilism, 3 Nietzsche hoped that the
mighty Dionysian energies unleashed by immediate cultural chaos would be
sufficient for the philosophers of the future to rebuild European culture according to his specifications.
PART I: THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY
In his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche prophetically called for the
recovery of the daimon of tragedy to exorcize the specter of nihilism haunting
the doomed European civilization of his day. Soon after Bismarck had triumphantly proclaimed the German Reich as the successor to the Holy Roman Empire,4 a young philologist sternly warned his hubristic fatherland that it had no
right to place itself at the pinnacle of European Culture. Nietzsche scandalized
the Hellenists and educators of his day by scornfully ridiculing their belief that
Athenian culture, celebrated by Pericles as the School of Hellas, was all sweetness and light: a harmonious blend of logic, oratory, mathematics, music and
architecture. Instead, he contended that these shining Apollonian achievements
arose out of a dark and unblinking realism about the objective value of human
life. 5 Nietzsche claimed that European civilization, just like that of Athens,
would be overthrown by its own hubris and optimism if it ignored the more dangerous roots of culture. He warned that the regnant democratic values of equality and freedom, coupled with an arrogant belief in the powers of reason and the
pursuit of effortless pleasure, would produce dissipation, decadence and calamity. Correctly seeing that man could not live by bread (and circuses) alone with-
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out nihilism ensuing, he sought to create new modes of spiritual authority and
political order.
,'
Nietzsche's early views were much influenced by Schopenhauer's assertion
':. that the primal entity at the heart of reality is a blind unconscious Will to Life.
All things are illusions, short-lived dreams generated by the Will as it strives
endlessly to perpetuate its darkly irrational existence. 6 While Schopenhauer's
1
: mood is one of Buddhist resignation towards human bondage to the passions,
Nietzsche seeks to articulate the tenets of a so-called pessimism of strength. 7 He
' will try to educate a few good men who would drain this bitter cup of truth with
him, whilst praising life and promoting tragic virtue.
Nietzsche claimed that Greek tragedy was a higher synthesis of the two
very different ways of coping with the harsh realities and cruel necessities of
human life. Sophocles seems to have anticipated Schopenhauer's insight into the
human condition in words he attributed to Silenus: "O wretched ephemeral race
. . . what is best for you is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born . . . but the
second best is for you to die soon" (Oedipus at Co/onus 1224.ff.)8 • Mortals naturally have two ways of evading awareness of their unfortunate state of embodied
individuality: they can either take refuge in Apollo through otherworldly dreams
and delusive illusions, 9 or they could temporarily extinguish their consciousness
entirely and lose themselves in an ecstatic celebration of Dionysian intoxication
and excess. 10 Of course this suggests, contra Socrates, that the examined life is
emphatically not worth living; even though it is said to be our highest and most
divine faculty, rationality is truly the greatest source of misery and torment to
our species.
Yet Nietzsche tells us that the invention of tragedy, which we must recall
served as both a cultural and religious institution, made it possible for the Athenians to live in a manner that consciously celebrated the highest possibilities of
both man and life itself. This means that philosophy, which strives optimistically
to discover a veiled truth that could only blind and nauseate it, had to be subordinated to the muse of poetry. Nietzsche himself decisively resolves the dispute
between the poets and the philosophers in favor of the former party. In
Nietzsche's own words BT took on the problem of science, 11 which caused nihilism when it was left to its own devices and treated as an end in itself. Science
had to be viewed by art, and art had to serve the interests of life 12 if mankind
was not to be overwhelmed by pessimism and decadence. Nietzsche suggests
that the period of Greek decadence began when sophisticated rationalism, democracy and prosperity corrupted the Athenians, who had in their virtuous past
been inspired by the divine madness of Dionysus to staunchly affirm life in all
of its bittersweet fullness.
Tragedy, which literally means "trag-odes" or "goat-song" may be seen as
the belatedly enlightened swan song of a sacrificial victim or scapegoat who
sees his life flash before him and celebrates its completeness. This inspired institution made it possible for the demos of a Greek polity to recover oneness and
gain wisdom as they studied the life and passion of Dionysus, literally god-son
or son of God, through the sublime veil of music. The tragic hero, whether Oe~.
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dipus, Orestes, or Heracles, was an incarnation of Dionysus-the bastard son of
Zeus-who painfully gains human recognition of his divinity, only to be tom to
shreds by his frenzied followers at this moment of apotheosis as they seek to
possess and consume his body and blood. While Dionysus does perform seemingly divine miracles, his mortal part ensures that these are short-lived 13 albeit glorious. Gods live and die so that life may continue to have meaning for
mankind.
This re-enactment of the famous choice of Achilles would also give sober
understanding and a measure of comfort to those condemned by the grim necessities of poverty and nature to expect nothing more than a life of changeless obscurity. Whilst admiring the beauty of heroic striving, when presented with the
inevitable results of hubris and excess they learn not to envy the great in their
temporary exaltation. There is suddenly not so much distance between lives of
short-lived glory and bitter obscurity; indeed the hero gains immortality in the
memories of those many who continually find enlightenment in contemplating
his agon. Nietzsche's main point is that mortal life can only be justified as an
aesthetic experience; it can never give us lasting happiness or moral justification. He condemns both Christianity and Science for their optimism: the one
speaks of a loving personal God and the other promises impossible happiness in
this life-which offers no final solutions. In other words, strange gods are worshipped and the youth are corrupted.
Nietzsche harshly criticizes Euripides and Socrates for fatally undermining
Athens by invoking moral criteria in aesthetic/religious matters and demanding
that the tragic regime justify itself rationally. By making the rational individual-not the extended satyr chorus of tragedy-the measure of meaning, these
two decadent intellectuals destroyed the unity of the polis and tore apart the
veils of Maya that protected humanity from the naked ugliness of Fortuna.
While Nietzsche ironically suggests that Euripides is both a thinker and a poet, 14
he reserves his shrillest criticism for Socrates who equated beauty with logical
intelligibility, not appreciating that beauty replaced intelligibility as the only
means of grasping the living truth about reality. Nietzsche ironically quotes Socrates' famous statement that Anaxagoras with his Nous seemed like a sober
man amidst a throng of drunken revelers. 15 But this meant that, like Euripides,
Socrates refused to understand the Dionysian theodicy. He knew nothing and
took pride in his ignorance; but this only meant that, since his instincts were
unhealthy and ignoble, he could not know the heightened awareness of the ecstatic bacchante. His daimon was a negative principle.
Nietzsche's brief history of the West is completed when we look to his later
works. Under the influence of the rationalistic criticism of Euripides and Socrates, along with the forces of hubris and democratization that both caused and
were accelerated by the Peloponnesian War, the tragic culture of Athens buckled
and died. It was replaced by an Alexandrian regime of scientific rationality that
was transplanted through the world conquered by the Macedonian empire. Even
though the Hellenistic age was soon replaced by a thousand years of Roman
Christianity, which renewed and deepened the Socratic opposition of life and
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morality by dismissing the Earth as a vale of tears and looking to an afterworld
for truth and justice, the Reformation soon revived the Alexandrian project. The
Reformers spawned a moralistic and technological culture that after strangling
the promising aesthetic revival begun by Renaissance humanism then caused
God's death and religion's redundancy by creating a democratic empire of cultural Philistinism. Democracy and technology are closely related because the
Christian belief in a God who loves all equally regardless of deserts, thus leaving all men equal after the Death of God, is compatible with a world where admiration at the heroic deeds of exceptional individuals is replaced by lazy faith,
greedy hope and undeserved charity-vices based on the anonymous and inhumane generosity of science.
Although BT concludes with an embarrassing panegyric to Richard Wagner, Nietzsche offers little explanation as to how the Bard of Bayreuth would restore tragedy and redeem humanity from cultural philistinism. One of the chief
weaknesses of this work is its exaggerated belief in the power of music to bring
about a political revolution. Even if tragedy was the cultural cement of Athens,
the sheer size of the modem state militates against its playing this role in his
time or ours; vulgar nationalism or violent fascism would be more likely to be
spawned in the modem era. Though his next work on this theme does not refer
to Wagner or Socrates, Nietzsche is far more explicit about the political and historical categories informing his thoughts.
PART II: THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY
While his first Untimely Meditation directly discussed the problems posed by
the non-event of the Death of God and deplored the smug culture of historical
optimism and cultural philistinism that pervaded the Second Reich, it is only in
UM2 that Nietzsche develops a philosophy of cyclical history for the postChristian epoch. Yet, although this essay into history is brilliantly insightful and
strikingly original, it has many classical antecedents that Nietzsche is careful not
to mention. The solution to the problem of history posited in this work is structurally similar to that put forward in BT; in both instances he offers three possible solutions to the problem of decadence; they include a higher synthesis that
prudently incorporates the strengths of the other two positions.
UM2 begins by warning of the risk of a culture being overwhelmed by an
indigestible glut of historical data. Reprising Silenus' warning to the curious,
Nietzsche argues that the uneducated must not be exposed to the heartbreaking
cruelty and meaningless chaos of the totality of human history; seeing that life is
devoid of meaning or value, the best fall victim to apathetic relativism and the
worst embrace violent barbarism. As we cannot all be a-historical, like cattle
living in the eternal now, Nietzsche argues that history must be formed and
made conducive to life. "And this is the universal law; a living thing can only be
16
healthy, strong, and fruitful when bounded by a horizon." This is "the basis for
cheerfulness, a good conscience, a joyful deed and confidence in the future. All

,
98

Nature, Nurture and Nietzsche's Faith in Life

of them depend, in the case of an individual as of a nation, on the existence of a
17
line dividing the bright and knowable from the dark and obscure."
Like the Sabbath, history was made for man; it must serve life and cannot
judge it. In the language of BT history needs a muse, a Wagner. His art provides
the players with a master plot and historical horizon in which they will act. In
tum, these actions give their non-critical spectators a sense of spiritual gravity
and source of meaning. In UM2 Nietzsche identifies three different kinds of
history: Monumental, Antiquarian, and Critical. They are described respectively
as being appropriate to those who (a) act and strive, (b) preserve and revere, and
(c) suffer and seek deliverance. 18 While this regime could very easily be viewed
in traditional mediaeval terms, as being composed of nobles, clergy and peasants
respectively, things are not as simple as they seem.
Monumental history is created for those worthies who restlessly strut and
fret about the world-historical stage. Nietzsche describes them as those who desire immortal fame and tum to history; they must believe in the continued possibility of greatness--even if this is gained through falsely imposing past precedents on a different present, "monumental history deceives by analogies," 19 and
only result in barbarism and genocide. Seeking to literally emulate the feats of
past heroes, and valuing glory above life, they are eternally opposed to those of
the common herd who seek to live at any cost and refuse to believe that the violent young bravos of the present could ever match the deeds of their godlike
ancestors. Those hoi po/loi who "preserve and revere" whilst believing in providence and historical necessity, are the true consumers of Antiquarian history.
They are the backward looking chorus of believers and kneeling camels on
whose bowed backs the drama of history is staged for the future. Both types
need each other; pious Antiquarian history gives heroism an afterlife by sanctifying the violent deeds and forgetting the brutal times of the Monumental gloryhounds.
The bearers of Antiquarian remember the past but are themselves forgotten,
while the heroes of Monumental history must forget much to be remembered.
Heroes cannot afford to recall "the essential condition of all happenings, this
blindness and injustice in the soul of him who acts." The hero is as singleminded as a mother nursing her child: "He who acts loves his deed infinitely
more than it deserves." Zarathustra says that he "makes his virtue his addiction
and his catastrophe: for his virtue's sake he wants to live on and live no longer.
(He) does not want to have too many virtues. One virtue is better than two-it is
more of a noose on which his catastrophe may hang. " 20 Yet, these nooses are
woven together by the Nous of a Critical historian who turns out to be a real
maker of history-whilst not being counted among its heroes. While we know
far more about Achilles than we do about Homer, it is yet legitimate to ask ifthe
choreographer is greater than his dunce-like dancer. Also, would the original
Achilles recognize himself in the Iliad? ls it better to be known or renowned?
Nietzsche would have us see poets like Homer, Plato, Shakespeare, and himself
as invisible and uncrowned makers (poietes) of human nature.
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Achilles and Alexander are good examples of the profane material that history is made from. For all we know Achilles, who lived 400 years before Homer, was a brutal young thug-a Greek Billy the Kid-whose life was magically
transmuted into an eternal symbol of doomed mortality by the poet's genius.
Critical reading of the Homeric epics reveals ample evidence to support the view
that these works actually warn mankind against ever repeating the violent folly
of their ancestors, deeds that plunged Greece into many centuries of darkness.
Still, 400 years after Homer, a "monumental" reading of his poems would lead
another young thuggish military genius, Alexander, to destroy Greek liberty
forever whilst seeking to emulate Achilles and conquer the entire world.
It is clear that neither the lions of Monumental history nor the camels of
Antiquarian history are capable of seeing the naked truth: the empty randomness
and ugly necessities governing human events. It takes an exceptional person to
unblinkingly observe these phenomena; blind Homer and exiled Thucydides
come to mind, and their understanding is often accompanied by an inability to
exercise power in their own name and time. Yet they can train the historical actors of the future whilst also providing less discerning and fearful mortals comforting shadows to light their way to justly obscure graves. They hope that this
"new stem discipline" of critical history will "implant in us a second nature so
that our first nature withers away" in "an attempt to give our-selves a posteriori
a past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one
did."21
There is much that is violent about Critical history. "If he is to live, man
must possess and from time to time employ the strength to break up and dissolve. "22 Blindly oblivious to justice, it sees that every past "is worthy to be
condemned for that is the nature of human things . . . violence and weakness
have always played a mighty role in them." 23 Yet this violence is in the service
of Life "that dark driving power that insatiably thirsts for itself' and passes
judgment "its sentence is always unmerciful, always unjust ... For all that exists
is worthy of perishing ... to live and to be unjust is one and the same thing." 24
Nietzsche reminds us that historical justice can only be vindicated by Eosterity:
"only he who constructs the future has the right to judge the past." 5 We are
warned not to seek the appearance of justice if we are called to the dreadful vocation of being a just man. 26 It seems that these critical historians are trying to
follow and imitate Schopenhauer's Will to Live.
Still, Critical historians who "suffer and seek deliverance" cannot gain anything like salvation in the ontology described by Nietzsche. They merely find
transcendence from the nauseating spectacle of human delusion and impotence
by continually weaving the shining Apollonian illusions that protect the many
from the naked Dionysian truth about themselves. This royal art of weaving is
used as an image of true statesmanship in Plato's eponymous dialogue; the ruler
has to spin together the spirited and moderate elements of the citizenry so that
his polity endures. 27 The tragic poet plays the same role in uniting historical actors and spectators to praise Dionysus, the god of chaos, while keeping him safely beyond the city walls. Likewise, the Critical historian's esoteric art ensures
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that the Monumental and Antiquarian narratives stay safely within the horizons
defined by their respective powers to bear truth and sustain the endless relay
race of life. 28
INTERLUDE: BACK TO THE FUTURE?
The tripartite account of history that Nietzsche has set forth here must be seen to
correspond to a much older account of human types originally articulated by a
poet who lived at about the same time as Homer. In his Works and Days Hesiod
divided mankind up into those who could see, those who could learn to see, and
those who were incapable of seeing. In talcing about sight, he is referring to the
"mathema" the knowable things. This corresponds in a way to the word "idea"
which in its non-technical original sense meant the "look" of a thing. Hesiod
distinguishes between (a) those rare seers who are not blinded by ignorance and
passion, (b) the few, who learn to see and live by learning from those who know
29
and (c) the incorrigibles who will never learn to see or live properly.
Nietzsche is less hopeful since, as we know, he believes that only very few
can or should look into the heart of darkness and see reality as it is. His three
types of history are, as we have seen intended for (a) the hidden creators of artificial truth, (b) those few who learn to act on the tragic-historical stage created
by the creators, and (c) the herd-like masses capable only of mindless and superstitious lives. We note that even the first class will avert their eyes from
primal reality and instead contemplate the intermediary Apollonian world of
their creation. In other words, the three types must co-exist collectively.
There is also an even more significant intellectual antecedent to this tripartite regime. Although Nietzsche vigorously attacks Socrates and Plato in the
name of pre-philosophic tragic pessimism, his own solution to the problems of
progressive philistinism ultimately amounts to a flatfootedly literal recreation of
the draconian regime, which I interpret as satirically depicted in Plato's Republic. His three kinds of history exactly correspond to the three soul types: Intellectual Guardians, Heroic Warriors and Herd-like Workers. All of them held in a
cave by different relationships towards commonly held noble fictions. While the
perfectly just city of the Republic is fated to self-destruct, and can be shown to
be a reductio-ad-absurdum of tyranny and utopian authoritarianism, the several
historical lies that Nietzsche deploys here are intended to be the basis of an actual polity. While Plato's Republic mutedly tries to show that the soul rather
than the city is the true bearer of virtue, 30 Nietzsche has so little trust in the
soul's power to be virtuous that he places his trust in the outcome of a process
ruled by chance, fraud and violence. Thus, ten years later, in the persona of Zarathustra, a Nietzsche grown old and wise urged a generation of free spirits to
sacrifice themselves for the future. 31 While religious German soldiers going to
the Great War were given a Bible to take with them, the irreligious could choose
32
Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra as alternative reading for the trenches.
In BT and UM2, Nietzsche hoped that Wagner and he would jointly create
the ruling mythology for the Post-Christian age. These wishful dreams were
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finally dashed at Bayreuth 1876 when Wagner revealed himself to be merely
another Romantic seeking redemption. 33 This meant that, since Nietzsche soon
despaired of finding the spirited or Monumental class that would follow him, he
bad to turn directly to the rabble. Just as laconic Socrates had to learn music,
Nietzsche had to become the mouthpiece of Dionysus. Like Moses, he saw that
he had to lead a small band of free spirits out of the equivalent of the Fleshpots
of Egypt: the vulgar optimism of Imperial Germany. As this quest for "free spirits" proved fruitless, Nietzsche realized that he had to look beyond his own
time; like Moses he had to unleash plagues on the present, advance the collapse
of modem civilization, and brew all of Europe a deadly brew of anarchic violence. He also had to become reconciled to not entering his Promised Land as
its philosopher king. No longer the guide and master of his own exodus, he had
to become a sacrifice and bridge for the over-man. Just as Dionysus is doomed
to perish at his moment of apotheosis, Nietzsche must "go under" and take a
generation down with him if his hopes are to stand any chance of success. This
is why the sometime prophet of Dionysus self-consciously calls himself "the
crucified one." 34 Instead of living as wise sage, he had to perish gloriously as a
misunderstood god.
PART Ill: ZARATHUSTRA AND HIS PROGENY

This is also why, while Nietzsche's earliest writings were relatively easy to understand but hard to follow, his last works are as enticingly easy to follow as
their ultimate purpose or end is obscure. Since "Zarathustra's Prologue" is rich
in symbolism, and contains the essence of Nietzsche's movement from tragedy
to comedy, I will decipher some of its pregnant and suggestive images that give
provide the key to his masterpiece.
In this prologue to Zarathustra, ominously titled "a book for everyone and
no-one" Nietzsche, who earlier described himself as a kind of Prometheus figure, carrying his ashes up to his mountain 35-presumably because his fire had
been refused-now decides to return to humankind. 36 Ten years have lapsed
since his last abortive donation, a period roughly corresponding to the years
1873-1883: the time separating UM2 from the first part of Zarathustra. The sage
now bears all of mankind a gift, whilst conceding to a retired hermit that he too
no longer loves man. 37 The classical reference suggests that Promethean fire,
representing enlightenment for those few with forethought, will soon be replaced by Pandora-literally all-giving or giving to "all." This donation is made
to the demotic many who must be compelled to become free spirits. Seeing that
his gift, the neglected cave-fire of tragedy, is going out, Prometheus turns arsonist38. The "all" of the rabble receive a bright shiny gift, albeit one they neither
appreciate nor understand. This Pandemic firebrand will drive them from their
decadent cave-like civilization, out into reality. However their ultimate destination is not revealed.
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When Zarathustra enters a town, and meets a crowd assembled to watch a
tightrope walker, for entertainment now rules public space, he uses the opportunity to preach the over-man. Claiming that man (like all the other beasts) must
evolve towards something better, he warns that man at present is "more ape than
any ape." 39 What is truly human? The sage claims that the over-man shall be
"the meaning of the earth."40 By this he means one who justifies life, not pointing to any otherworldly reward or kingdom, but by living well in the fullness of
reality. He fears that post-religious man will regress to become a crassly hedonistic animal -one whose selfishness will betray both the earth and the long
struggle of life that gave birth to consciousness and reason. While Zarathustra is
very critical of religious men who tormented the body, he has scathing words for
those who indulge the flesh and leave their souls poor, filthy and wretched. 41
This endless tug of war between body and soul cannot be the meaning of life.
Rather, the great powers latent in human nature, the unity of the human mind
and the bounty of nature, must be actualized to celebrate life. Zarathustra scolds
those who too niggardly in exercising their virtues. 42
This raises the interesting question whether it is nobler to dedicate oneself
to destroying the forces of negation that stifle the souls of others, or to living as
good and exemplary a life as possible. We have seen much to suggest that
Nietzsche would combine the two but stress the former; a career devoted to the
tearing down of idols would be just the kind of brief glorious life that Greek
tragedy praised; furthermore, UM2 with its emphasis on the artificiality of culture does not stray very far from the wisdom of Schopenhauer and Sophocles on
the transcendent value of existence; life is cruel and there is nothing beyond the
body, shadows and cave.
The crowd had hitherto taken Zarathustra's words as praise for the tightrope
walker who begins his doomed act as the sage continues to extol selflessly heroic sacrificial virtue. He warmly proclaims his love for those who squander
their souls, and make their virtue an addiction and catastrophe; he blesses those
who justify the future and redeem the past by their wish to perish of the
present. 43 When Zarathustra finally realizes that he is not understood, he appeals
to his audience's shame by describing the last man and his victimless crime: the
invention of the art of vicarious happiness. 44 But even this shift to negative rhetoric does not work as he expected.
Zarathustra's last man no longer has "whirling chaos" in himself and can't
give birth to a "dancing star": moreover, he will not despise himself for this impotence. To him, human categories like love, creation and longing have no
meaning; everything is small and he makes everything small. This man's race is
ineradicable and he lives longest. Priding himself on his invention of happiness,
the last man practices neighborly love out of prudence; he blinks continually
because he can't concentrate on anything for too long; 45 his sleep is drugged and
his health is his religion; he only works because it is diverting and nothing is
worth serious attention. Leading and following require too much effort for the
last man who merely desires to feel what everyone feels; to him we are all the
same. 46
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Zarathustra is amazed to find that his dark prophecy meets with wild enthusiasm. "Give us the last man," the crowd cries like those who once said: "Give
us Barabbas!'.47 "Tum us into these last men, Then we shall make you a gift of
the over man."48 Following this total breakdown in communication, a dejected
Zarathustra is left alone with the broken body of the fallen tightrope walker to
ponder the dismissive vulgarity of the urban crowd.
This desire for the last man meant that Zarathustra' s greatest fear had all but
materialized; strikingly, the crowd's comic optimism is more nauseating to the
seer than the violence of history; like the tightrope walker, he too has plunged
into the abyss of despair. 49 Having starved their souls by first denying the stem
classical virtues, and then losing faith in an afterlife where sentimental virtue
would prevail over superb vice, the rabble were quite prepared to renounce their
souls (along with their human heritage of reason, conscience and freedom) in
exchange for a drugged dream of mindless comfort and endless entertainment.
God's death had become a cliche to the last man's shameless parents who knew
themselves only as pleasure centers. Godless Zarathustra could no longer shock
them: God had been made redundant by the triumphs of science and democracy.
But this only meant that (just as Christian rulers took over the Roman Empire
instead of ending it) the rabble would delegate the powers of God to a democratic over-manager. He would have a popular mandate to rule as a good shepherd
over tame beasts.
It is quite clear that such a regime would be inherently unstable; human nature being what it is, any ruler would surely be corrupted-if not by his own
vices then surely by the attenuated attention spans and hedonistic foci of his
subjects. 50 These "penultimate men" would be led by their desires and have minimal sense of a common good. As Nietzsche brilliantly observed in his Twilight
of the Idols, once we abolish the "real world" of the idealists, the apparent world
is also swept away in the flood of becoming. 51 It would seem that rank, order
and rule could only be re-established in such a narcissistic society after a rude
interregnum of anarchy that would reacquaint the populace with the ugliness of
reality and destroy all of the optimistic assumptions that advanced cultural decadence.
Yet, since we know that Nietzsche also believes in the artificiality of culture, he cannot afford to believe that Apollo will restore what Dionysus has not
destroyed. While he did not anticipate the invention of nuclear weapons that
could destroy the planet or foresee the insidious risk of environmental degradation, his instinct in this matter was sound. A weakened culture must first be destroyed and then rebuilt or restored as soon as possible, if necessary by hastening the very forces of decadence that "push down what is falling." 52 Nietzsche
enters the prologue as a Jester who makes the tightrope walker, also a symbol of
the old morality of two worlds, fall to his death making way for a violent new
order. 53
This is why Zarathustra, at the end of his prologue, leaves the dead to bury
the dead. 54 He now seeks living disci~les but even these unidentified men are
urged to lose him and find themselves. 5 Earlier, he begged them to remain faith-
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ful to the earth; they were to give life a new human meaning by recovering the
virtues exiled by otherworldliness. These rehabilitated virtues are violent and
destructive. Zarathustra's disciples had to restore the heroic qualities lost when
the "penultimate men" invented happiness by abolishing or forgetting the quintessentially human qualities of love, courage and honor in the name of pusillanimous prudence and passive-aggressive piety. The hour for Monumental history had come. The stubbornly held Antiquarian history of the pious slaves would
otherwise implode. This cultural collapse occurs as they await the coming of a
redeeming over-man; He establishes the era of the last man, the Son of Man, a
Kingdom that lasts forever.
In Zarathustra's account of the three metamorphoses of spirit, he tells of
three stages of history that must come to pass. 57 These stages correspond to the
tripartite schema of UM2, albeit in a diachronic (not synchronic) way. The first
stage, the Camel, is the era of Antiquarian history; the Camel is like the
tightrope walker we met, with a broken back. It may be seen as human beingfor-itself seeking being-in-itself by its passive refusal of freedom. Invulnerable
only in the heel, it must humbly bear every burden of faith, and struggle through
the swirling sands of history, until it turns into a Lion. The Camel fears anarchy
and bears new laws well, giving them time to become instinct and second nature. But when laws are tired and irrelevant, the last man rides in on its stiffnecked reverence.
The stage of the Lion is the transformation that Zarathustra must steel himself to bring about; in other words, like Moses, his eyes are not destined to witness the culmination of the entire process. The Lion's task is to denounce and
destroy all that is false, old and morally coercive. He must find and destroy the
old Dragon that enslaved the camel-like spirit for many thousands of years. The
Dragon of tradition enslaved the spirit with the words "thou shalt." 58 This Dragon, representing all created value, jealously guards the treasure of human freedom. The Lion cannot create values, but it must deliver the spirit from enslavement by roaring out its sacred ''NO." The Lion must find vanity, illusion and
caprice in even the most sacred things so that the spirit may be liberated from
the burden of sin and slavery. Though the Lion frees the spirit from ancient
loves and dead duties, this spirit is yet a purely destructive force. Its transformation into the glorious form of Monumental history may only occur when the
Lion is given new horizons that will explain and glorify its great acts of destruction. This blond beast needs these pellucid justifications to cleanse and purify its
deeds; only these purposes and reasons will give beauty and nobility to a gory
narrative that would otherwise depict little more than prideful sound and vengeful fury.
Only Apollo can give subsequent grace and healing beauty to a chaotic
Bacchanal-an orgy of the spirit that must surely be incapable of being beheld
by a sober witness. Here we see the third Critical stage of history: the Child.
One is reminded of Heraclitus saying that "kingship belonfcs to a child" 59 but
more suggestive is the lyre playing David who slew a Lion and killed the armor-clad dragon Goliath using a child's toy. The David of Michelangelo is an
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iconic image of the cool judgment and easy confidence of the Renaissance-the
era that should have followed the Reformation and the leonine nay-saying stance
61
ofLuther.
Although Nietzsche, from the vantage of critical history, has already
sketched out the form of the transformations that he would like to see, we have
noted that he is Moses and not David; this means that he speaks only as a "seer"
of the future. Much of Zarathustra treats of the difficulty that Nietzsche, the
diffident classicist, finds in adapting his message to the loud demotic tones of
the Lion. The difficulty of this task is considerable: he has to convince an entire
generation-the generation of WWI and the trenches-to go under or commit
suicide. Like Moses the stammerer, he finds a priestly mouthpiece in Zarathustra-a Nietzsche grown old and wise-who shatters the tablets of dualist morality62 and kindles the sacred fire of his people. It is in this persona that Nietzsche
will play his part in the transition between Antiquarian and Monumental history.
He will be bringing about the actual deeds of Monumental history, as we noted
when discussing the life and myth of Achilles, these deeds are far uglier than the
shining accounts of glorious feats that his posterity will see and be inspired by.
This was why, with the exception of the Founder, Joshua, none of the lost generation of the Exodus could take his own memories of Moses, Egypt and Sinai
into the Promised Land.
The time finally comes for Zarathustra-Nietzsche to give affirmation to the
voice of the Lion that he will successfully employ in his last works; he is compelled to do so after a kind of Gethsemane scene where the old sage finally
drains the chalice of violence to the lees as a toast to his shameless bride: Life. 63
The age-old Homeric affinity between Ares and Aphrodite is used to transform
the wild irrational Will of Schopenhauer into a prodigal feminine principle of
life that he and his disciples will follow when they are pledged to "Be faithful to
the Earth." More accurately however, the true subtext for this dalliance with
life's vitality and violence is the virile humanism of Machiavelli's Prince.
Dame Fortuna, Machiavelli's promiscuous replacement for Fate, both appreciates and drains youthful virility; once a prince or poet has had his way with
her, there is no guarantee that she will always be his muse and mistress. 64 He
must prove his love for life repeatedly on what could only be called the slaughter-bed of Fortune. When an old woman advises Zarathustra: "You are going to
woman? Don't forget the whip!" 65 Nietzsche is clearly thinking of his Italian
predecessor. The same claim could be made of his notorious claim that "Good
and bad women all want a stick. " 66 When Zarathustra is nauseated by the prospect of the eternal return of the same, 67 it is because this has the same prodigal
fertility of the Will to Life. Of course this principle of the eternal return suggests
that the cyclical order of things is not entirely irrational or random; it is ruled by
an evolving version of cyclical history in dialectical interaction with the Will as
power. This Thucydidean force of ananke (necessity) whips Fortuna and directs
her historical trajectory. Nietzsche finds that this human meaning to history is a
less nauseating goal to command and preserve.
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Now since the era of the Camel had barely ended in Nietzsche's own time,
it was clear that the era of Critical history and philosophy was many generations
away-beyond the trenches and holocausts of the bloody Twentieth Century.
Yet, for all this, Nietzsche does address the philosophers of the future. Among
other things, he does this to ensure that his master plan or outline of critical history will be available and understood, even if not necessarily followed, when the
time finally comes for the philosopher-poet to take in hand the tiller of Zeus and
guide the destiny of man.
Post-Modernist philosophers have famously offered their accounts of a liberal Nietzsche, basing their scholarship on some of our subject's more inflammatory writings-works written with the express intention of demolishing the
strongest remnants of the culture of the past so that the badly over-due revaluation of values could come about. If there is any doubt about Nietzsche's own
expectations as to what a new and sustainable culture would look like, one only
needs to turn to The Antichrist (AC), one of his last and most radical works,
where he lays out an account of a tripartite political regime that still faithfully
hews to the model set forth in Hesiod's Works and Days and Plato's Republic.
In the Antichrist, Nietzsche lavishes high praise on the Law of Manu, saying that "Here, the noble class: the philosophers and the warriors, stand above
the mass." 68 Nietzsche further states that "A law such as that of Manu ... sums
up the experience, prudence and experimental morality of many centuries; it
concludes: it creates nothing further. " 69 By this he means that once the age of the
Lion is over, the philosopher-founders establish a rigid new law code: "At acertain point in the development of a people, the most circumspect stratum, that is,
the one who sees furthest back and ahead, declares the experiment to be concluded ... what must now be prevented above all is further experimentation, a
continuation of a fluid state of values, testing, choosing, criticizing values ad
infinitum." 70
Nietzsche now goes on to explicitly endorse the tripartite model after first
stating that an order of castes or rank is "the supreme and dominant law which is
sanctioned by the natural order and naturally lawful, an institution over which
no arbitrariness or modem idea possesses any authority." 71 Every healthy society
has "three types which condition each other and gravitate, differently, physiologically; each has its own hygiene, its own field of work ... Nature not man
distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual ones, those who are eminently strong in
muscle and temperament and the mediocre ones; the last are the great majority,
the first as the elite." 72
Those of the highest caste are said to "find their happiness where others
would find their destruction: in labyrinths, in hardness against themselves and
others, in experiments; their joy is self-conquest ... they rule not because they
want to but because they are; they are not free to be second." 73 Likewise the
second class are "the guardians of the law, those who see to order and security,
the noble warriors and above all the king as the highest formula of warrior,
judge and upholder of the law." "Those of this class are the executive arm of the
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most spiritual . . . that which does everything gross in the work of ruling for
them, their retinue, their right hands, their best pupils." 74
Nietzsche finds nothing experimental or arbitrary about this: "The order of
castes, the order of rank, merely formulate the highest law of life; the separation
of the three types is necessary for the preservation of society, to make possible
the higher and highest types." 75 We cannot underestimate the privileges of the
lower class; the artisans in the Republic had comforts (private property and
family) that were not available to the higher classes. Life is harder as one climbs
higher. Nietzsche compares culture to a pyramid, which must stand on the massive base of a "strong and solidly constructed mediocrity." 76
In all of this we can see how Nietzsche, philosopher and fervent enemy of
nihilism, satisfies the masses' quest for substance and contentment (being-initself) by separating, from the misguided or uneducated "being-for-itself' of the
spirited class, what he had previously united with it to advance decadence. Here,
he is but reiterating Aristotle's claim that man is a political animal, along with
its corollary that those who can exist outside of a polity are either beasts or
gods. 77 But it is also worth noting that the classical polis did not interpose itself
between man and world, but was an oikos for the soul; Hellenistic philosophy,
which believed that man could be educated and the world improved, was not
ruled by a rigid doctrine of types but held that the various elements of the soul
could be led towards virtue by transcendental Eros and maieutic example.
Even though Nietzsche's thought represents a great advance over Schopenhauer's pessimism, which only offer the diversion of art and music from an otherwise bleak and cruel world, Nietzsche's basically hierarchic structures indicate
the ultimately limited satisfaction that even the philosopher: "one who suffers
and seeks deliverance," can gain from this world. While his exhortations to "Be
faithful to the Earth" and "Give life a new human meaning" are of much value
in liberating the human spirit from the death-grip of other-worldly abstractions
and resentful pieties, his preference for violence in both speech and deed is a
minimal advance over religious resignation. He ends up using the power-driven
idiom of the optimistic Modems he despised -never ridding himself of the legacy of de-Hellenized and Post-Nicean Christianity, belief in an omnipotent creator ex-nihilo. Also, since Nietzsche did not believe in the "enduring power" or
integrity of the soul, Socrates' eponymous discovery, he deduced that any argument based on an appeal to truth is ultimately doomed to failure and disappointment. Accordingly, he appeals to Caesar and says that a philosopher is
strong enough to bear truths that break most hearts.
Perhaps we should look to build further on Nietzsche's recognition that getting rid of the true world also destroys the apparent by both acknowledging the
fact that the Earth or purely physical world needs a superstructure of non-natural
artifacts and intelligible objects (works of art, music, history and literature) and
by also noting that this human meaning can be immortal and not historically
conditioned propaganda-as Nietzsche may imply. While it may be fruitless to
make rough love to Fortuna, sweet uses made of adversity in the past could outlive their immediate horizon and bring lasting solace and joy to all who cultivate
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their gardens: body and soul. Humanistic virtue of this kind is gained one soul at
a time, but it makes it possible for anyone to see, and desire to share, a world of
beauty they could expect all educated persons to participate in. This capacity
gives us hope in humanity's ability to live in a commonwealth of true human
meaning: one that faithfully realizes the promise of Earth's blind fertility. It also
rejects that other infidelity to the Earth: the last man's vain hope to dwell forever
in a technological utopia.
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